Hijacking, False Flags, Terrorist Threats? – Hungary’s Election Campaign as a Hybrid Warfare Battleground

Op-eds rarely begin with self-reflection, and for good reason. Almost a year ago, I warned that Hungary’s April 2026 elections could effectively become the European Union’s first rigged electoral contest, with far-reaching implications for the Union’s democratic integrity and decision-making.

How and why this could happen, I elaborated on in detail in this scenario paper. We have a week to go until we see whether Hungarian and European politics can avoid this dark scenario, but its likelihood is increasing day by day.

What I certainly did not see coming is the extent to which instruments associated with hybrid warfare are infiltrating and beginning to shape the electoral campaign in Hungary.

I am certainly not a full-blooded hard security analyst who believes that Russia’s “little green men” and the Kremlin’s active measures are the primary drivers of European politics. I tend instead to reflect on what Europe’s own strategy should be rather than to deep-dive into our adversaries’ tactics. I consider this introduction and self-reflection important in order to signal the weight of my assessment when I speak about hybrid warfare in any context. This is not my hammer; therefore, I do not usually see nails— or emerging problems—as hybrid warfare threats.

Boots on the Ground

Even six weeks ago, during a tabletop exercise in mid-February, I argued that we should not think about challenges to the democratic integrity of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Hungary primarily in terms of hybrid warfare. I found it intellectually cheap and out of touch with political realities.

That statement of mine has not aged particularly well, and my previous position has been overtaken by political realities. Apparently, the more desperate an authoritarian regime becomes to avoid losing power—and the more dependent it is on the Kremlin—the more the tools deployed from the authoritarian toolkit come to resemble Russian hybrid warfare practices.

This did not begin today with the false-flag attack against the Turkish Stream pipeline complex in Vojvodina, Serbia. Hybrid warfare entered the Hungarian election campaign on March 5, when Hungarian special forces hijacked a fully legal and registered money transfer between Raiffeisen Bank and the Ukrainian Oschadbank on Hungarian territory, worth more than €70 million. I covered the details and consequences of this action for Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral relations and the Hungarian election campaign in my previous piece.

What happened today does not represent a new quality, but rather a lock-in of the hybrid warfare logic—a doubling down on hybrid warfare measures with one fundamental consequence: they will remain with us and will continue to shape the logic of the campaign.

On Easter Sunday, April 5, unidentified actors carried out an apparent false-flag operation targeting the Turkish Stream pipeline on Serbian territory, near the Hungarian border in Vojvodina, in the vicinity of Trešnjevac (Oromhegyes). The operation involved the placement of two bags containing high explosives and detonators in proximity to critical infrastructure; these devices were subsequently identified and neutralised by Serbian authorities. Concurrently, the alleged attack has been instrumentalised by the Hungarian government as a justification for placing the domestic segment of the Turkish Stream pipeline under military protection, while attributing responsibility to Ukraine and invoking parallels with the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage.

The Hybrid Theater

With an eye on the political implications of the attempted attack, the political situation is desperate, tragicomic, and serious in equal measure.

It is certainly desperate, because leaks about a potential false-flag attack with identical features were published days earlier by Hungarian analysts and media outlets, revealing the target, the location, and the logic behind the entire operation. The plans of the Hungarian regime and its Russian and Serbian supporters were practically uncovered and unveiled. The fact that, despite this, Prime Minister Orbán and the Kremlin decided to proceed reveals how desperate the political situation is for Fidesz.

At the same time, the story is also tragicomic—not only because they proceeded with an action whose contours had already been publicly described as a potential false-flag operation by the Hungarian government, but also because of its cowardly, theatrical nature. No harm was done; the explosives were planted, but discovered and defused. The whole operation was designed to work exclusively in the communication space. It was a false-flag terrorist attack in the tradition and style of Hungarian operetta.

The decision-makers in Budapest did not dare to risk any damage to critical infrastructure—too high were the stakes, both in terms of potential social responses to supply shortages and with regard to criminal liability.

Particularly with regard to criminal responsibility, the choice of location is telling. An alleged attack on Hungarian soil could have triggered serious investigations and criminal prosecution in the event of a Tisza election victory. Prime Minister Orbán and the Kremlin wanted to ensure that such consequences could be avoided, thanks to the firm hand of a certain Serbian ally.

However, first and foremost, the situation is serious and threatening. With this false-flag operation, Prime Minister Orbán has demonstrated that he sees no red lines when it comes to the preservation of his power. The conclusions that can be drawn are twofold.

First, the more distant an election victory for Fidesz appears to be and the closer Tisza comes to the possibility of a two-thirds constitutional supermajority, the higher the likelihood of authoritarian escalation on the part of Fidesz. In the language of game theory, the probabilities of both the best- and worst-case scenarios are increasing simultaneously.

Second, Orbán has significantly raised the stakes with this operation. While it may be difficult to prosecute the perpetrators under charges such as treason or other crimes against the state, the charge of preparing a terrorist act (§ 314 Hungarian Criminal Code) could plausibly apply. This raises the sword of Damocles of unprecedented criminal consequences for stakeholders of the Orbán regime—unseen for any government since the country’s democratic transformation in 1989–1990.

Knowing this, he may now be even more motivated to double down on authoritarian measures. The final days before the April 12 elections may be particularly sensitive from this perspective. European partners, if they want to avoid further authoritarian escalation in Hungary, should reach out behind closed doors to representatives of the Hungarian government and signal that they will not tolerate further hybrid warfare or authoritarian measures—and that the recognition of the Orbán government under international law could be at stake should Budapest fail to follow this advice.

The Orbán regime has been acting as a trailblazer of autocratization in the European Union. Illiberal practices that were once limited to Hungary are now widespread and present in multiple Member States. Against this background, the EU should not underestimate the importance of the precedent if an illiberal government deploys false-flag terrorist attacks and other measures of hybrid warfare in an election campaign and can walk away with it without serious consequences.

The Serbian Connection

Whether there is collusion between the Hungarian, Russian, and Serbian regimes in the implementation of this measure will become evident through the reactions and investigative work of the Serbian authorities.

One thing is clear. If the authorities of an EU candidate country are engaged in attempts to unduly influence the outcome of elections in an EU Member State—particularly if this occurs in covert cooperation with political forces from that country and the Russian Federation—this cannot remain without political consequences for the accession process of that candidate country and for the relationship between EU institutions and its government.

Against that background, it is in the utmost interest of the Serbian government to conduct all investigations with a level of transparency, impartiality, and professionalism that dispels any suspicion of Serbian involvement.

Any other outcome would not only put the future relationship between Serbia and the EU, as well as between Serbia and a future democratic Hungarian government, at risk, but could (and should) also expose members of the Serbian security apparatus and political leadership to potential EU sanctions and criminal liability in Hungar