Why Hungary Is Blocking Ukraine's Next Step Toward EU Membership Again?

On June 15, Hungary officially lifted its long-standing veto on opening accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals), raising expectations that the remaining five negotiating clusters could also be opened during the July meeting of the EU Council. Recent reports, however, hint at the possibility of renewed Hungarian opposition to further progress in Ukraine’s accession process. It is therefore unavoidable to ask why the new Hungarian government continues to block Ukraine’s next steps in the accession process and what the way out of the current situation might be.

Domestic Politics First

Hungary’s foreign policy since the April election has been driven, at least in part, by domestic political logic. Beyond the strategic objective of re-establishing Hungary as a constructive member of the European Union, Prime Minister Péter Magyar has primarily focused on issues where he could demonstrate his ability to resolve long-standing disputes that his predecessor, Viktor Orbán, had failed to address, and then use those successes as domestic political capital.

The compromise on the rights and protection of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine fell into this second category. With that issue resolved, the Hungarian government lost its main motivation to engage constructively with Ukraine in the short term.

From a transactional perspective, lifting the Hungarian blockade of the €90 billion EU financial package for Ukraine was necessary to restore Hungary’s image as a constructive partner within the EU. Likewise, approving the opening of accession negotiations under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) was necessary to secure Ukraine’s agreement on enhanced protections for the Hungarian minority. Beyond these steps, however, further constructive engagement with Ukraine offers no immediate political benefits to Péter Magyar and his government.

Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Magyar has shifted back to domestic political considerations and is seeking to shield his government from potential attacks by the opposition parties Fidesz and Our Homeland („Mi Hazánk”), both of which are likely to accuse him of having made too many concessions to Kyiv.

It is important to underline, however, that the Hungarian government’s arguments do not stand up to factual scrutiny.

The Case Against Hungary’s Blockade

Hungary’s position that it opposes an accelerated accession of Ukraine is entirely legitimate, and Budapest is certainly not alone in holding this view. However, neither the “as soon as possible” language in the draft conclusions of the latest European Council nor the opening of the remaining five negotiating clusters has anything to do with Ukraine’s accelerated accession. It merely creates the opportunity for Ukraine to advance in the accession process, if it wishes and is able to do so, according to its own level of ambition and on the basis of merit.

Nor is this unfair to the Western Balkan candidate countries, as Péter Magyar argues. Albania opened all six negotiating clusters between October 2024 and December 2025, while Serbia opened four clusters simultaneously in December 2021. There are therefore ample precedents for candidate countries opening multiple negotiating clusters at once or doing so in rapid succession in the Western Balkans, even in the absence of the extraordinary geopolitical circumstances that Ukraine currently faces.

The country that is genuinely treated unfairly by the repeated Hungarian blockades is, aside of Ukraine, Moldova, whose accession process remains linked to that of Ukraine.

Hungary Already Has Sufficient Leverage throughout the Accession Process

According to survey data collected in late 2025, a majority of Hungarian society opposes Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. However, these public attitudes are themselves the product of years of sustained anti-Ukrainian propaganda under Viktor Orbán’s government. As Hungarian citizens are no longer exposed to this constant stream of negative messaging and instead have access to independent reporting on developments in Ukraine, these attitudes are likely to evolve.

The government of Péter Magyar should trust Hungarian society and have confidence in its own ability to explain why a constructive position—one that does not block the opening of negotiating clusters for Ukraine—is in Hungary’s interest and can be understood by the public. Hungary’s consent will still be required at later stages of the accession process: for the provisional closure of all 33 negotiating chapters, for the conclusion of the negotiations as a whole, for the approval of the Accession Treaty, and ultimately for its ratification.

In total, future Hungarian governments will have 36 opportunities to exercise a veto if they conclude that Ukraine has failed to fulfil its obligations, including those concerning the protection of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Hungary’s legitimate national interests can therefore be effectively safeguarded at later stages of the accession process.

Blocking the opening of Clusters 2–6 and thereby preventing Ukraine from advancing in the negotiations according to its own merits has nothing to do with protecting legitimate Hungarian interests. It runs counter to the principle of good neighbourly relations, jeopardises future reconciliation between Hungary and Ukraine, and resembles the bad-faith tactics employed by previous Hungarian governments.

The way forward

There is still time before the July 14 EU Council meeting, and therefore still an opportunity for the Hungarian government to agree to the opening of the remaining negotiating clusters. So the door must be also kept open.

While some may be tempted to play hardball with Budapest, given that Hungary’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan also requires the consent of the other member states in July, this would be both a fatal and short-sighted mistake. It could push the new Hungarian government back onto a confrontational course, undermining the broader renewal of Hungary’s EU and foreign policy. It could also lock both Hungary and Ukraine into another prolonged period of bilateral confrontation, making Budapest’s opposition to opening the remaining negotiating clusters even more entrenched.

A more constructive middle course would be for Hungary’s partners to show patience while making it clear that blocking all five remaining clusters is unacceptable. Instead, they could seek agreement on opening two or three clusters, including Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and Cluster 6 (External Relations), where Ukraine’s positions are the most advanced. This could, in the same way, also be communicated as a success for Ukraine.

At the same time, the Hungarian government should begin speaking openly and honestly about Ukraine’s accession process in the domestic context. While Ukraine’s accession is likely to be long and its outcome remains uncertain, it is clearly not in Hungary’s national interest to obstruct it from the very beginning. After almost a decade of adversarial policies under the Orbán regime, the new administration should demonstrate a genuine commitment to improving bilateral relations and supporting reconciliation. Blocking the opening of the negotiating clusters on July 14 would do nothing to foster the mutual trust that such reconciliation requires.